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CONSEQUENCES OF CAMBODIA’S RUBBER BOOM:
ASSESSING THE GOVERNMENTAL, ENVIRONMENTAL,




Rubber production in Cambodia, stimulated by the creation of
economic land concessions (“ELCs”) in the 1990s, is a growing industry
that is tapping the country’s vastly forested lands.1 Rubber is now the sec-
ond largest agricultural export, behind only rice, and exports generated
an estimated $200 million in 2011.2 Despite the relatively late and er-
ratic development of rubber plantations in Cambodia, they have become
one of the driving forces behind the country’s emergent economy.3
The government has high hopes for the industry. It plans to export
more than 1 million tons of rubber and employ a workforce of 1.3 million
by 2018.4 This projected expansion of the rubber industry, according to cur-
rent Prime Minister Hun Sen, will boost gross domestic product (“GDP”),
alleviate unemployment, and reduce rural poverty.5 Other sources, how-
ever, are not as optimistic and cite a number of governmental, environmen-
tal, and human rights violations associated with this booming industry.
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1 Neou Vannarin & Simon Lewis, Hun Sen Shares Vision of Rubber Plantation Boom, THE
CAMBODIA DAILY (Feb. 22, 2013), http://www.cambodiadaily.com/archives/hun-sen-shares
-vision-of-rubber-plantation-boom-11253/ [https://perma.cc/DS7T-KLQF].
2 Sok Serey, Rubber Gives New Bounce to Economy, RADIO FREE ASIA (Apr. 12, 2012),
http://www.rfa.org/english/news/cambodia/rubber-04122012174332.html [https://perma.cc
/TK6V-EEBE].
3 Amy Kaslow, Searching for Economic Hope in Cambodia, FORTUNE (Aug. 2, 2013),
http://fortune.com/2013/08/02/searching-for-economic-hope-in-cambodia/ [https://perma
.cc/BA6Y-JAUW].
4 See Vannarin & Lewis, supra note 1.
5 Id.
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Disregard for regulatory framework, forced evictions, inadequate com-
pensation for workers, and destruction of protected property are some of
the harms alleged by civil society organizations.6
Because the regulatory framework governing rubber plantation
operations has been linked to a number of abuses, current laws and poli-
cies must be re-examined and improved to safeguard the Cambodian peo-
ple and environment from adverse effects of the industry.
Part I of this Note examines the historical development and
current status of Cambodia’s rubber industry—tracing its relatively late
and sporadic development from the French colonial period to the current
era dominated by ELC companies. This section also discusses the regula-
tory framework governing the industry, which includes laws and policies
enacted by the Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries (“MAFF”).
Part II describes recent trends and future projections in the
country’s rubber industry. This part also discusses technical concerns
within the industry. Moreover, this section exposes specific governmen-
tal, environmental, and human rights violations linked to the industry.
For example, reports from civil society groups show how certain rubber
plantations exceed their size restrictions,7 engage in “land grabbing” prac-
tices, and subsequently displace thousands of indigenous families.8
Finally, Part III analyzes the current efforts toward combating
the alleged abuses and recommends new strategies to strengthen the
current laws and policies already in place. Since the government has in-
dicated plans to draft new laws specifically tailored to the industry,9 it
has an opportunity to minimize, and perhaps even prevent, the detrimen-
tal effects of rubber plantations.
6 INT’L FED’N FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, CAMBODIA LAND CLEARED FOR RUBBER RIGHTS
BULLDOZED: IMPACT OF RUBBER PLANTATIONS BY SOCFIN-KCD ON INDIGENOUS COMMU-
NITIES IN BOUSRA, MONDULKIRI 6–7 (2011) [hereinafter FIDH], available at http://www.fidh
.org/IMG/pdf/report_cambodia_socfin-kcd_low_def.pdf [https://perma.cc/PYB3-UNE3].
7 COMPLAINT CONCERNING IFC INVESTMENT IN DRAGON CAPITAL GROUP AND VEIL 6 (2014)
[hereinafter Complaint Concerning IFC Investment], available at http://www.cao-ombuds
man.org/cases/document-links/documents/ComplainttoCAOreDragonCapital-HAGL.pdf
[https://perma.cc/QV2K-6XVP].
8 FIDH, supra note 6, at 14.
9 Rann Reuy, Rubber Draft Law Addresses Regulatory Holes, THE PHNOM PENH POST
(Apr. 26, 2013), http://www.phnompenhpost.com/business/rubber-draft-law-addresses
-regulatory-holes [https://perma.cc/A84C-ZLPZ]; see also REPORT ON RUBBER SECTOR 2013
AND ACTION PLANS (2014), available at http://bit.ly/1qsmB4U [https://perma.cc/2B5E
-WQAJ].
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I. HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF CAMBODIA’S RUBBER INDUSTRY
A. French Colonial/Pre-ELC Era
Rubber production in Cambodia began relatively late compared
to neighboring regions and other countries in French Indochina.10 The
country’s first plantation was built in 1911 in Prey Nop, Kampot, which
comprised about 150 hectares (“ha”).11 The next two decades witnessed
a “rubber boom”12 in which French investors set up large-scale planta-
tions in Kampong Cham, Kampong Thom, and Kratie provinces.13 The
basaltic red soils native to these provinces proved to be suitable for
rubber production because they had high water-storage capacities and
produced high yields despite a long dry season.14 The total area of planta-
tions grew to 27,000 ha15 during the “rubber boom” and produced an
estimated 13,000 metric tons in 1937.16
The Japanese invaded French Indochina in 1940, and, as a result,
Cambodian rubber production stalled throughout World War II.17 After
the war, production resumed and output eventually matched and even
exceeded pre-war levels, despite the reduced number of plantation
workers.18 In 1949, the first rubber union was formed, and its leaders
focused on improving the living standard of plantations workers.19 Al-
though Cambodia gained its independence in 1953, the industry re-
mained largely controlled by French companies.20 Private and state-owned
10 Mitch Aso, Rubber and Race in Rural Colonial Cambodia (1920s–1954), 12–13 SIKSACAKR.
127, 127 (2010–11), http://www.academia.edu/5042707/Rubber_and_Race_in_Rural_Co
lonial_Cambodia [https://perma.cc/VG7Q-8T2Y].
11 Id. at 128.
12 Id.
13 Id.
14 See YEM DARARATH, NETH TOP & VUTHY LIC, THE ECONOMY AND ENVIRONMENT PROGRAM
FOR SOUTHEAST ASIA, RUBBER PLANTATION DEVELOPMENT IN CAMBODIA: AT WHAT COST?
12 (2011), available at http://www.eepsea.org/pub/tr/Rubber%20Report-Cambodia-Yem
%20Dararath-et-al-Technical-Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/XAT9-YH7D].
15 Martin Murray, White Gold or White Blood? The Rubber Plantations of Colonial Indochina,
1910–40, 19 J. PEASANT STUD. 41 (Special Issue) (1992).
16 Aso, supra note 10, at 128.
17 Id. at 135.
18 Id. at 136.
19 Id.
20 SAING CHAN HANG, THE ASIA-PACIFIC RESEARCH AND TRAINING NETWORK ON TRADE,
EXPORT COMPETITIVENESS OF THE CAMBODIAN RUBBER SECTOR RELATIVE TO OTHER
GREATER MEKONG SUB-REGION SUPPLIERS: A SIMPLE DESCRIPTIVE ANALYSIS 5 (2009),
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plantations also began emerging, and that year total production surpassed
20,000 metric tons.21
The rubber industry was again halted due to the escalating conflict
between the United States and Vietnam and the takeover by the Khmer
Rouge.22 In 1979, production declined to fewer than 10,000 tons,23 and the
total area of plantations was reduced to nearly 50,000 ha.24 The fall
of the Khmer Rouge and ensuing Vietnamese occupation in the 1980s
brought about a centralized economic regime that nationalized all rubber
plantations.25 During this time, the industry recovered with technical
assistance provided by the Soviet Union.26
The Vietnamese withdrew from Cambodia in 1989, and rubber
plantations were reorganized into seven state-owned companies (Chup,
Peam Cheang, Krek, Memut, Snuol, Chamkar Ondoung, and Boeng Ket),
two privately owned plantations, and several smallholder-household
plantations.27 State-owned plantations would eventually comprise over
sixty-three percent of the industry, as opposed to the thirty-seven percent
that were privately owned.28 The Cambodian economy relied heavily on
state-owned industrial crops, in which rubber contributed an average
forty-one percent of GDP from 1994 to 2003, and exports averaged 45,000
tons annually.29
B. ELCs and Their Legal Framework
1. The Rise of ELCs
Rubber plantations were driven by socialist economic policies for
much of the 1980s and early 1990s.30 However, political regime changes
available at http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.584.8111&rep=rep1
&type=pdf [https://perma.cc/XF3C-USA8].
21 Aso, supra note 10, at 136.
22 HANG, supra note 20, at 6.
23 JOCELYNE DELARUE & NAOMI NOËL, L’AGENCE FRANÇAISE DE DÉVELOPPEMENT,
DEVELOPING SMALLHOLDER RUBBER PRODUCTION: LESSONS FROM AFD’S EXPERIENCE
6 (2008), available at http://www.afd.fr/webdav/site/afd/shared/PUBLICATIONS/RE
CHERCHE/Evaluations/Evaluation-capitalisation/26-VA-rapport-cambodge-evaluation
-capitalisation.pdf [https://perma.cc/CUG6-87TC].
24 DARARATH, TOP & LIC, supra note 14, at 13; HANG, supra note 20, at 6.
25 HANG, supra note 20, at 6.
26 Id.
27 DARARATH, TOP & LIC, supra note 14, at 13; HANG, supra note 20, at 6.
28 DARARATH, TOP & LIC, supra note 14, at 2.
29 Id. at 13–14.
30 Id. at 14.
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and the liberalization of the national economy have shifted the industry
to a more market-based approach.31 This is evidenced by the government’s
implementation of the “Rectangular Strategy.”32 Moving away from state-
run plans, the policy aims to privatize rubber plantations and promote
smallholder cultivation.33
In 1993, the government began releasing state-owned rubber
plantations to non-government owners, self-managed plantation enter-
prises, rubber industry associations, and other private actors.34 Liberal
legislative acts, such as the 1994 Investment Law, 1997 Law on Taxation,
1997 Law on Foreign Exchange, and 1997 Labor Law, were adopted that
ultimately allowed foreign investors to control 100 percent of the share-
holding in a firm.35 The government also attracted foreign investment
through relaxed business restrictions, which included low corporate in-
come taxes, favorable export quotas, formation of special economic zones,
and low labor unit costs.36
The creation of ELCs contributed to the full retreat of the public
sector from the rubber industry. Administered by the MAFF, ELCs are
long-term leases given to domestic and foreign companies that use their
land grants for agro-industrial purposes like sugar, cassava, acacia, and
rubber production.37 By 2007, MAFF granted approximately 1 million ha
of ELCs, which were largely located on indigenous communities’ land.38
Although the 1993 Cambodian Constitution recognizes the right to enjoy
private land ownership, the government may deprive citizens of their
property on the basis of public interest so long as the government pay
31 FIDH, supra note 6, at 12.
32 ROYAL GOVERNMENT OF CAMBODIA, RECTANGULAR STRATEGY FOR GROWTH, EMPLOYMENT,
EQUITY AND EFFICIENCY, PHASE III (2013), available at http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups
/public/---asia/---ro-bangkok/---sro-bangkok/documents/genericdocument/wcms_237910
.pdf [https://perma.cc/9PDG-G9QT].
33 ROYAL GOVERNMENT OF CAMBODIA, 2006–2010 NATIONAL STRATEGIC DEVELOPMENT
PLAN 46 (2005), available at http://www.paris21.org/sites/default/files/cambodia-nsdp
-2006-2010.pdf [https://perma.cc/XM8Y-X83K].
34 DARARATH, TOP & LIC, supra note 14, at 14.
35 FIDH, supra note 6, at 12.
36 Id.
37 Id. at 13.
38 See MEN PRACHVUTHY, ROYAL UNIVERSITY OF PHNOM PENH, LAND ACQUISITION BY NON-
LOCAL ACTORS AND CONSEQUENCES FOR LOCAL DEVELOPMENT: IMPACTS OF ECONOMIC
LAND CONCESSIONS ON THE LIVELIHOODS OF INDIGENOUS COMMUNITIES IN NORTHEAST
PROVINCES OF CAMBODIA 6 (2011), available at http://www.landgovernance.org/system
/files/Cambodia_landacquisition_impacts_indigenouspeople.pdf [https://perma.cc/Q66B
-37AU].
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fair and just compensation.39 In several cases, the granting of ELCs has
led to social unrest, destruction of rural villages, and displacement of
families without valid titles to their respective lands.40
2. The Legal Framework of ELCs
The 2001 Land Law and subsequent government subdecrees pro-
vide the legal framework behind the land concessions. Land is divided into
five categories: state public property, state private property, private in-
dividual property, monastery property, and collective indigenous com-
munity property.41 ELCs can be granted on state private property,42 which
is land that can be privately possessed, owned, and sold.43 No sale of
private land may be made in the absence of a subdecree.44 State public
property refers to land of natural origin or land intended for public in-
terest, such as forests, rivers, and lakes.45 ELCs cannot be allowed on
state public property; however, distinctions between the two categories
of land are often imprecise due to incomplete mapping or inadequate land
identification.46 The MAFF may grant ELCs larger than 1,000 ha, but total
coverage area cannot exceed 10,000 ha.47
Environmental and social impact assessments must also be fulfilled
before production begins.48 For example, MAFF is expected to evaluate
the effects on the living standards of surrounding communities and en-
sure that lawful land holders do not involuntarily resettle.49 Furthermore,
concessionaires must start operations within one year of the ELC being
39 FIDH, supra note 6, at 26.
40 VALUE CHAIN UNIT, CAMBODIA MINISTRY OF COMMERCE, RUBBER SECTOR PROFILE 7
(2012) [hereinafter RUBBER SECTOR PROFILE].
41 FIDH, supra note 6, at 26.
42 INDIGENOUS CMTY. SUPPORT ORG. ET AL., THE RIGHTS OF INDIGENOUS PEOPLES IN
CAMBODIA, ANNEX B. LAND LAW 2001 at 16 (Article 58) (2009), available at http://www
.forestpeoples.org/sites/fpp/files/publication/2010/08/cambodiacescripssubmissionapr09
eng.pdf [https://perma.cc/2P3B-QRHM].
43 INDIGENOUS CMTY. SUPPORT ORG. ET AL., supra note 42, Annex B. Land Law 2001, at
6 (Article 17); FIDH, supra note 6, at 26.
44 INDIGENOUS CMTY. SUPPORT ORG. ET AL., supra note 42, Annex B. Land Law 2001, at
6 (Article 17); PRACHVUTHY, supra note 38, at 14–15.
45 FIDH, supra note 6, at 26.
46 Id.
47 INDIGENOUS CMTY. SUPPORT ORG. ET AL., supra note 42, Annex B. Land Law 2001, at
6 (Article 59).
48 DARARATH, TOP & LIC, supra note 14, at 16.
49 FIDH, supra note 6, at 27.
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granted.50 A Technical Secretariat has been appointed to oversee ELC
compliance with governmental regulations and determine whether the
land concession should be cancelled due to a violation of contract terms.51
The government plans to draft new laws specifically tailored to the
rubber industry to better regulate plantation activities and address is-
sues of quality management.52 According to MAFF officials, the new laws
will provide a comprehensive legal framework that covers all stages of rub-
ber production—from planting and harvesting to processing for export.53
As Cambodia readied itself for the Association of Southeast Asian
Nations (“ASEAN”) Economic Community in 2015, which created a single
and common market among the ten ASEAN countries,54 stakeholders in
the industry saw the new laws as a way to improve the quality of rubber
exports.55 The proposed laws would limit the different kinds of rubber
trees farmed on plantations and, consequently, standardize and increase
the marketability of Cambodian rubber exports.56 As of April 2013, around
eighty percent of the drafted law had been completed before it was even-
tually submitted to the MAFF.57
II. CURRENT SITUATION AND VIOLATIONS LINKED TO CAMBODIA’S
RUBBER INDUSTRY
A. Recent Developments and Trends
The concerted efforts to privatize the rubber industry have been
met with transformative results. By 2008, six of the seven state-owned
plantations had privatized while the last state-run estate was divested a
year later.58 The industry employs roughly 100,000 people,59 and total cov-
erage area of plantations has increased to 300,000 ha by some estimates.60
Plantations span fourteen provinces, such as Kampong Cham, Kratie,
50 INDIGENOUS CMTY. SUPPORT ORG. ET AL., supra note 42, Annex B. Land Law 2001, at
17 (Article 62).
51 FIDH, supra note 6, at 27.
52 Reuy, supra note 9.
53 Id.
54 ASEAN Reaffirms 2015 Goal for Economic Community, KYODO NEWS INT’L (Feb. 27,
2014), http://www.globalpost.com/dispatch/news/kyodo-news-international/140227/asean
-reaffirms-2015-goal-economic-community [https://perma.cc/GBS2-JYDV].
55 Reuy, supra note 9.
56 Id.
57 Id.
58 FIDH, supra note 6, at 12; HANG, supra note 20, at 6.
59 Vannarin & Lewis, supra note 1.
60 Serey, supra note 2; Vannarin & Lewis, supra note 1.
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Kampong Thom, Ratanakiri, Mondulkiri, Battambang, Preah Vihear, and
Pailin.61 Kampong Cham, heavily influenced by French colonial rubber
companies in the 1920s, is the most important province for rubber pro-
duction with more than 90,000 ha under cultivation.62 Its geographic lo-
cation also allows for easy trade access into Vietnam.63
Rubber production has also consistently increased and, in 2011,
an estimated 44,969 tons were produced—making Cambodia the world’s
ninth largest producer of rubber.64 Cambodia’s main export destinations
are Vietnam, China, Malaysia, and Singapore, and exports were valued
at $170 million in 2013.65
Presently, three categories of rubber growers have emerged: pri-
vately owned plantations, smallholder plantations, and ELC companies.66
Private plantations consist of the seven state-owned rubber estates that
were denationalized in 2008 and 2009.67 In 2011, private estates produced
approximately 20,000 tons of rubber, and total plantation area spanned
nearly 51,000 ha.68
Smallholder, or household-owned, plantations typically consist of
one or two plots of land, averaging 2.8 ha in total area.69 Smallholder oper-
ations have increased in number and size since their formation in the early
1990s—largely due to government policies that allocate parts of the former
state-owned plantations to rural farmers.70 Between 2006 and 2011, the
area of smallholder plantations jumped from 25,000 ha to 85,000 ha,71 and
smallholders now account for forty-five percent of all rubber plantations.72
There are currently more than 21,000 smallholder families nationwide,
producing an estimated 36,000 tons of natural rubber.73
61 CAMBODIA INV. BD., REPORT ON THE PRIVATE SECTOR IN CAMBODIA 9 (2011), available
at http://www.cambodiainvestment.gov.kh/content/uploads/2011/09/Chapter7.pdf [https://
perma.cc/3ME4-CCGG].
62 RUBBER SECTOR PROFILE, supra note 40, at 10.
63 Id.
64 Serey, supra note 2; RUBBER SECTOR PROFILE, supra note 40, at 5.
65 HANG, supra note 20, at 1; Rubber Price Decline Stokes Worry, KHMER TIMES (May 14,
2014), http://www.khmertimeskh.com/news/1483/rubber-price-decline-stokes-worry/ [https://
perma.cc/4K6R-X32W].





71 CAMBODIA INV. BD., supra note 61, at 10.
72 Vannarin & Lewis, supra note 1.
73 CAMBODIA MINISTRY OF COMMERCE, CAMBODIA’S DIAGNOSTIC TRADE INTEGRATION
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ELCs are large-scale, agro-industrial operations granted to foreign
and local investors.74 As of 2012, ninety-four rubber-producing ELC com-
panies have been contracted.75 ELCs have planted nearly 120,000 ha of
rubber plantations,76 while more than 450,000 ha of untapped land have
been allotted for future investment.77
B. Future Projections
During the 2013 Cambodia Outlook Conference, Prime Minister
Hun Sen expressed his plans for a rapid expansion of the country’s rub-
ber industry.78 He projects 840,000 ha of rubber plantation will be tapped
and that one in ten Cambodians will be working in the industry by 2018—
creating 1.3 million jobs.79 Since the Prime Minister considers trees on
rubber plantations to be part of the country’s forest cover, he believes the
industry is sustainable for the environment and that plantations will
replenish the 1.5 million ha of land already converted to ELCs.80
The government has also prioritized the development of small
(fewer than 5 ha) and intermediate (5–50 ha) rubber plantations in an
attempt to combat rural poverty.81 The Ministry of Economy and Finance
was equally optimistic in its projections and claimed that Cambodia has
the potential to export more than 1 million tons of rubber by 2020—a fig-
ure that would match production levels with the competing Vietnamese
market.82 The Prime Minister expects Cambodia’s industry to become
larger than Vietnam’s because of its diminishing lands available for rub-
ber plantations.83
Non-government observers of the industry show more conservative
estimates of growth. According to Radio Free Asia, rubber plantations
STRATEGY 2014–2018 333 (2014) [hereinafter CAMBODIA’S DIAGNOSTIC TRADE INTEGRA-
TION STRATEGY].
74 RUBBER SECTOR PROFILE, supra note 40, at 8.
75 CAMBODIA’S DIAGNOSTIC TRADE INTEGRATION STRATEGY, supra note 73, at 333.
76 Id.
77 RUBBER SECTOR PROFILE, supra note 40, at 8.
78 Vannarin & Lewis, supra note 1.
79 Id.; Neou Vannarin, Hun Sen Hopes for Increased Rubber Exports, THE CAMBODIA DAILY
(May 16, 2013), http://www.cambodiadaily.com/archives/hun-sen-hopes-for-increased-rub
ber-exports-24502/ [https://perma.cc/V54X-EYL6].
80 Hun Sen, Opening Address at the 2013 Cambodia Outlook Conference: Securing
Cambodia’s Future: Food, Energy and Natural Resources (Feb. 20, 2013), available at
http://cnv.org.kh/?p=3475 [https://perma.cc/ZR86-PCZV].
81 DELARUE & NOËL, supra note 23, at 15.
82 Vannarin & Lewis, supra note 1.
83 Vannarin, supra note 79.
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could total 400,000 ha and export 300,000 tons by 2020.84 A representa-
tive from the International Monetary Fund (“IMF”) also assessed that
Cambodia’s economy had the potential to grow at seven percent in the
medium term in 2013 due to the government push but would still be vul-
nerable to internal and external weaknesses in the industry.85
C. Technical Concerns Within the Industry
1. Global Surplus, Decreasing Demand for Cambodian Rubber
Despite the promising trends in the country’s rubber industry, a
number of challenges could weaken the competitiveness and marketabil-
ity of Cambodian rubber. One such issue is the growing surplus of rubber
worldwide, which is steadily decreasing the demand for Cambodian
rubber.86 According to a representative of Chop Rubber Plantation, a
major rubber exporter, the global oversupply of natural rubber reduced
their prices significantly from $3,100/ton to $2,100/ton in 2013.87 Domes-
tic demand for rubber is also very low and studies have revealed that
“there is currently very little domestic use in secondary or tertiary in-
dustries for Cambodia’s natural rubber (sic) products.”88
2. Shortage of Skilled Workers for Rubber Tapping
Although Cambodia’s relatively low-cost labor is a competitive
advantage, the quality of the workforce could constrain the industry’s an-
ticipated growth.89 As more rubber trees continue to mature and become
ready for production, the country will encounter a shortage of experienced
and skilled workers capable of tapping them.90 The process of rubber
tapping requires specialized training and is a delicate process by which
84 Serey, supra note 2.
85 Vannarin & Lewis, supra note 1.
86 Hor Kimsay & Anne Renzenbrink, Cambodian Rubber Earnings Fall, THE PHNOM PENH
POST (July 31, 2013), http://www.phnompenhpost.com/business/cambodian-rubber-earnings
-fall [https://perma.cc/8FHN-MG34].
87 Id.
88 CAMBODIA’S DIAGNOSTIC TRADE INTEGRATION STRATEGY, supra note 73, at 338.
89 Id. at 336. The report cites a 2007 study finding that the rubber sector “employed around
27,000 people directly and up to 40,000 indirectly when taking into account seasonal
workers and subcontracted workers. However, given the significant expansion in pro-
duction capacity and exports since 2007, it is likely these estimates under-estimate the
current size of the sector’s workforce.”
90 Id.
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latex is collected from a small incision made in the bark of a rubber tree.91
Consequently, the lack of skilled tappers in the country could lead to rub-
ber trees being left untapped or even permanently damaged—resulting
in diminished yields.92
3. Marginal Processing Capacities and Inferior Quality of
Cambodian Rubber
Processing capacity is another key concern for the booming industry.
Processing technologies for natural rubber are limited in Cambodia; mod-
ern facilities that can process natural rubber products in large quantities
and at satisfactory standards for export are scarce.93 The high cost of
electricity deters investment in national processing facilities94 and, as a re-
sult, contributes to the current situation where semifinished products from
Cambodian plantations must be exported to Vietnam for further process-
ing.95 In 2003, the cost to process rubber in Cambodia averaged around
$97/ton, compared to $70/ton in Vietnam and $60/ton in Indonesia.96
Furthermore, the quality of Cambodian rubber has been catego-
rized as an inferior grade to those produced in competing countries.97
Trade markets classify Cambodian Specified Rubber (“CSR”) 5L below
the international standard of Technically Specified Rubber (“TSR”) 5L.98
Rubber producers in Cambodia, therefore, not only hamper their compet-
itiveness in international trade but also risk revenue losses by not im-
proving their production quality.99 The Prime Minister cautioned that
failure to upgrade rubber quality would adversely affect the industry and
result in losses valued at about $600 million by 2020.100
4. Trade-Related Disadvantages
Cambodia lags behind other countries in the greater Mekong
region, except for Lao People’s Democratic Republic, in terms of total
91 Id.
92 Id.
93 CAMBODIA’S DIAGNOSTIC TRADE INTEGRATION STRATEGY, supra note 73, at 337.
94 DELARUE & NOËL, supra note 23, at 11.
95 CAMBODIA’S DIAGNOSTIC TRADE INTEGRATION STRATEGY, supra note 73, at 337.
96 DELARUE & NOËL, supra note 23, at 11.
97 Serey, supra note 2.
98 HANG, supra note 20, at 1.
99 Serey, supra note 2.
100 Id.
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rubber export production.101 Cambodia exported 54,000 tons of rubber
worth approximately $158 million in 2012; these figures are relatively
small compared to Vietnam, where rubber exports totaled upwards of
1 million tons and amounted to $2.8 billion.102
Trade facilitation remains a significant concern for the industry.103
Cambodia is a low-yield producer, but high-cost processor compared to its
regional neighbors.104 Excessive export taxes, cash flow restrictions among
processors and producers, unofficial fees, and high transportation costs
have been cited as trade-related constraints that are weakening the com-
petitiveness of Cambodian rubber both regionally and globally.105
D. Violations
1. Encroachment onto State Public Property
According to Article 58 of the 2001 Land Law, land concessions
can only be granted on state private property.106 However, a number of
rubber plantations have been found to cover and destroy forested areas
in the country which are classified by current land laws as state public
property under Article 15.107 Examples of public property in Cambodia
include any property that has a natural origin (forests, courses of naviga-
ble or floatable water, natural lakes, banks of rivers, and seashores); any
property that is developed for general use (quays of harbors, railways,
and airports); any property that is allocated to render a public service
(public schools, administrative buildings, and public hospitals); and any
property that constitutes a natural reserve protected by the law.108
A well-known Vietnamese rubber producing ELC company in
Ratanakiri province, Hoang Anh Gia Lai (“HAGL”), has been linked to this
101 HANG, supra note 20, at 14.
102 Vannarin, supra note 79.
103 HANG, supra note 20, at 1.
104 Id.
105 Id.
106 INDIGENOUS CMTY. SUPPORT ORG. ET AL., supra note 42, Annex B. Land Law 2001, at 16
(Article 58); see also Complaint Concerning IFC Investment, supra note 7, at 6.
107 INDIGENOUS CMTY. SUPPORT ORG. ET AL., supra note 42, Annex B. Land Law 2001 at 5
(Article 15); Complaint Concerning IFC Investment, supra note 7, at 6 (referring to a com-
plaint to the World Bank, filed in February 2014, against the Vietnamese company, HAGL,
for allegedly violating environmental and human rights regulations in their rubber planta-
tions in both Cambodia and Laos).
108 INDIGENOUS CMTY. SUPPORT ORG. ET AL., supra note 42, Annex B. Land Law 2001 at 5
(Article 15).
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illegal exploitation of state public property for agro-industrial purposes.109
HAGL’s concessions have “blocked access to and destroyed ponds and
streams used by local communities,” which is specifically prohibited by
Article 58.110
2. Breach of Land Size Restrictions
Rubber ELCs have also been known to exceed their size restric-
tions. As stated in Article 59 of the 2001 Land Law, a land concession may
not exceed more than 10,000 ha; unless a specific exemption is granted
by a government subdecree, a concession that exceeds the limit will be
reduced.111 Furthermore, “the issuance of land concession titles on sev-
eral places relating to surface areas that are greater than [10,000 ha and
under the name of] one specific person or several legal entities controlled
by the same natural persons is prohibited.”112 In other words, one person
may not control multiple concessions that, when aggregated, total more
than 10,000 ha.
HAGL land concessions cover a cumulative surface area of approxi-
mately 47,370 ha, which is nearly five times the legal limit of concession
holdings.113 Despite claiming to have sold three of its concessions, HAGL
“has admitted to currently holding concessions over a surface area of
28,422 [ha],” which is a clear violation of the hectarage limitations pur-
suant to Article 59.114
HAGL’s breach of size restrictions is representative of many
ELCs that disregard the current regulatory framework through deceitful
business practices.115 For example, according to a study by the Interna-
tional Federation for Human Rights (“FIDH”) on rubber plantations in
Mondulkiri province, “[m]any concessions granted exceed the 10,000 ha
limit, and the grant of contiguous land to companies with different names
but pertaining to the same group has reached hundreds of thousands of
ha, although MAFF affirms that it has been reviewing those which exceed
109 Complaint Concerning IFC Investment, supra note 7, at 6.
110 Id.; INDIGENOUS CMTY. SUPPORT ORG. ET AL., supra note 42, Annex B. Land Law 2001
at 16 (Article 58).
111 INDIGENOUS CMTY. SUPPORT ORG. ET AL., supra note 42, Annex B. Land Law 2001 at
16–17 (Article 59).
112 Id.
113 Complaint Concerning IFC Investment, supra note 7, at 6.
114 Id.; INDIGENOUS CMTY. SUPPORT ORG. ET AL., supra note 42, Annex B. Land Law 2001
at 16–17 (Article 59).
115 See also FIDH, supra note 6, at 13.
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this limit since 2009.”116 Basically, in order to bypass the government’s
size restrictions on ELCs, rubber-producing companies will buy adjacent
lands to their respective concessions and then register with MAFF under
different company names.117
3. Disregard for Environmental Impact Assessments
Rubber ELCs frequently violate Article 6 of the 1996 Law on
Environmental Protection and Natural Resource Management by failing
to conduct environmental impact assessments (“EIAs”) prior to commencing
project operations.118 According to this government subdecree, EIAs must
be conducted “for all public or private projects involving activities . . .
[such as] projects for agro-industry, wood and paper production, mining,
chemical plants, textiles, power plants, tourism, and infrastructure.”119
An EIA is a structured investigation that seeks to predict the
effects that a project or policy may have on the surrounding environment;
the EIA will focus on topics such as: “overview of the project or agro-
industry company; methodology and scope of the study; full project de-
scription and action plan; description of existing environmental resources
(including physical, ecological, and socio-environmental resources); envi-
ronmental impact mitigation measures; environmental management
plans; economic analysis compared with environmental costs; and conclu-
sions and recommendations.”120
A 2007 report by the United Nations Representative of the
Secretary-General for Human Rights in Cambodia found evidence that
agro-industry projects in the country are generally approved without a
proper EIA being conducted.121 Rubber-producing ELCs such as the
116 Id. The report also suggests that “[t]he number of disputes involving ELCs are [a]
testament to the fact that land is not being clearly identified as State public land (and
therefore available for investments) prior to allocation.”
117 Id.
118 See also Complaint Concerning IFC Investment, supra note 7, at 6.
119 See also Environmental Law and Environmental Impact Assessments, OPEN DEV.
CAMBODIA, http://www.opendevelopmentcambodia.net/briefing/eia/ [https://perma.cc/PM3V
-QCDT] (last visited Mar. 27, 2016).
120 Id.; see also EUROPEAN UNION DELEGATION TO CAMBODIA, COUNTRY ENVIRONMENT
PROFILE OF THE ROYAL KINGDOM OF CAMBODIA (2012), available at http://eeas.europa.eu
/delegations/cambodia/documents/publications/country_env_profile_cam_april_2012_en
.pdf [https://perma.cc/B2CP-YWXZ].
121 SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL FOR HUMAN RIGHTS IN CAMBODIA,
ECONOMIC LAND CONCESSIONS IN CAMBODIA: A HUMAN RIGHTS PERSPECTIVE 10 (June
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Vietnamese company HAGL in Ratanakiri province and the joint venture
company between Cambodia and France, Socfin-KCD, in Mondulkiri
province have allegedly breached the EIA requirements, according to
reports by civil society organizations.122
For example, Socfin-KCD failed “to take all necessary measures
to ensure violations would cease . . . [and] to work policies to ensure
respect of economic, social and cultural rights of the Bunong [who are the
indigenous people in Mondulkiri affected by Socfin-KCD’s agro-industry
projects].”123 On a similar note, HAGL has been criticized for not possess-
ing any kind of documentation proving the performance of EIAs prior to
commencement of their rubber plantation operations.124
One possible reason for the ineffectiveness of EIAs is that they are
often outsourced to private consultants, who have been hired by the
rubber land concession owners.125 According to a report by the European
Union Delegation to Cambodia, EIAs are “rarely carried out according to
the letter or the spirit of the law,” and the Cambodian government will
usually approve the assessments after payment of the service fee.126
4. Exploitation of Indigenous Communities’ Property Rights
Rubber ELCs have reportedly disregarded indigenous land tenure
rights, guaranteed by Sub-Decree No. 146 on Economic Land Conces-
sions, which allow the country’s recognized indigenous communities to
give or withhold their consent to any use of their land by outsiders.127
2007), available at http://cambodia.ohchr.org/WebDOCs/DocReports/2-Thematic-Reports
/Thematic_CMB12062007E.pdf [https://perma.cc/YWE9-VB3F] (reporting that “thorough
and genuine environmental and social impact assessments have generally not been under-
taken beforehand.”).
122 FIDH, supra note 6, at 6–7 (explaining how “[i]n 2007, the European company Socfinasia
entered into a joint venture with KCD [Socfin-KCD], of which it now owns 80% and en-
sures its operational management . . . [and how] Socfinasia is owned mainly by the French
industrial group Bolloré and Belgian families Fabri and de Ribes”); Complaint Concerning
IFC Investment, supra note 7, at 6.
123 FIDH, supra note 6, at 7, 16. The province of Mondulkiri is located on the eastern
border of Cambodia and is the largest, yet least populated, province in the country. Ninety-
four percent of the province is forested land. The ‘Bunong’ refers to the people who live
in the Bousra indigenous communities of Mondulkiri. According to census figures in 2008,
Bousra had a total population of 3,925 people in 849 family households.
124 Complaint Concerning IFC Investment, supra note 7, at 32.
125 EUROPEAN UNION DELEGATION TO CAMBODIA, supra note 120, at 31.
126 Id.
127 ROYAL GOVERNMENT OF CAMBODIA, SUB-DECREE NO. 146 ON ECONOMIC LAND CON-
CESSIONS 2005 (unofficial trans.) [hereinafter SUB-DECREE NO. 146 ON ECONOMIC LAND
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Indigenous communities use a customary land tenure system, wherein
collective ownership of property is recognized among the villagers.128 The
types of lands shared among the indigenous villagers include residential
areas, grazing lands, community forests, spirit forests, burial grounds,
reserved lands for future generations, farming and orchard plots, and
rice fields.129
The 2001 Land Law authorizes indigenous communities to manage
their land in accordance with their respective traditional customs.130 How-
ever, because of ineffective implementation of existing regulations and
an absence of government outreach to indigenous communities, several
indigenous villages affected by rubber-producing concessions were not
recognized as having collective ownership over their respective lands.131
Collective titles have been issued to only eight indigenous communities
out of an approximate total of 455.132 As a result, several lands belonging
to indigenous communities are acquired by private interests and then
illegally converted into agro-industrial projects.133
This is a common occurrence in Mondulkiri province, where the
joint venture rubber company Socfin-KCD was granted multiple conces-
sions on the Bousra indigenous community’s land.134 Ninety percent of
the population in Bousra are subsistence farmers, who practice shifting
cultivation and engage in the gathering of non–timber forest products.135
They practice a form of religious animism “[involving] the protection of
spirit forests and burial grounds for their ancestors.”136 Moreover, ninety-
nine percent of Bousra villagers who were polled in an extensive survey
CONCESSIONS], available at http://www.cambodiainvestment.gov.kh/sub-decree-146-on
-economic-land-concessions_051227.html [https://perma.cc/N25J-67M9].
128 Complaint Concerning IFC Investment, supra note 7, at 4 (citing how “the concept
of collective ownership over their territory and resources is central to the communities’
identity.”).
129 Id.
130 SUB-DECREE NO. 146 ON ECONOMIC LAND CONCESSIONS, supra note 127; FIDH, supra
note 6, at 35.
131 FIDH, supra note 6, at 35–36, 48.
132 Complaint Concerning IFC Investment, supra note 7, at 5.
133 See also GLOBAL WITNESS, RUBBER BARONS: HOW VIETNAMESE COMPANIES AND
INTERNATIONAL FINANCIERS ARE DRIVING A LAND GRABBING CRISIS IN CAMBODIA AND LAOS
38 (2013), available at https://www.globalwitness.org/en/campaigns/land-deals/rubber
barons/ [https://perma.cc/9PQ6-LAVH].
134 FIDH, supra note 6, at 6, 35.
135 Id. at 6.
136 Id.
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indicated that they considered themselves to be an indigenous group in
Cambodia and preferred to have collective ownership over their lands.137
Despite the Bousra villagers’ legitimate claim to their communal
lands,138 they have faced several challenges to attaining indigenous status
in the country. For example, the villagers in the Bousra community usu-
ally do not have the proper legal representation or “the necessary tools
to be in a position” to acquire a collective title from the government.139 In
addition, the arrival of Khmer (the non-indigenous, majority ethnic group
in Cambodia) families in the community at the end of the 1990s has
weakened the Bousra claim for indigenous status.140
Article 23 of the 2001 Land Law provides interim protection
measures for indigenous populations that have yet to register with the
government or that are in the process of registering, such as the Bousra
community.141 The Bousra villagers, however, have not benefitted from
these protective measures and have only encountered political, adminis-
trative, and procedural obstacles to securing a collective title.142 Socfin-
KCD has ignored any government provisions created to protect indigenous
communities’ lands and has proceeded forward with its rubber planta-
tion operations.143
As a result, Socfin-KCD now manages at least two concessions
within the Bousra village community that comprise over 7,000 ha.144 In
fact, according to FIDH’s study on rubber plantations in Mondulkiri prov-
ince, the creation of rubber concessions on indigenous lands have affected
over 850 families living within the Bousra community and have led to sev-
eral instances of forced eviction.145
137 See id. at 27, 35 (citing a survey undertaken by civil society organizations such as
Cambodian Human Rights and Development Association (“ADHOC”), Community Legal
Education Centre (“CLEC”), Indigenous Community Support Organization (“ICSO”), and
Caritas Cambodia, which interviewed 733 families).
138 See id. at 35 (citing that an “analysis made by a consultant in ethnology and sociology




141 SUB-DECREE NO. 146 ON ECONOMIC LAND CONCESSIONS, supra note 127; FIDH, supra
note 6, at 36 (stating that in 2011, seven communities in Bousra had initiated the regis-
tration process, three of which were already eligible to apply as legal entities and even-
tually petition the government for collective ownership over their indigenous lands).
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5. Involuntary Resettlement
Even if rubber ELCs do not recognize indigenous communities’
collective ownership over their respective lands, Sub-Decree No. 146 re-
quires that company representatives have public consultations with the
residents of indigenous communities in order to discuss solutions for
resettlement.146 According to the subdecree, the proposed land conces-
sions must present solutions for resettlement issues and the government
“shall ensure that there will not be involuntary resettlement by lawful
land holders and that access to private land shall be respected.”147
Similar to the disregard for EIAs and the exploitation of indigenous
property rights, the government has been ineffective and unsuccessful in
the relocation of indigenous residents affected by ELCs.148 In the case of
HAGL, in addition to hindering indigenous communities’ land tenure
rights in Ratanakiri, the Vietnamese rubber company failed to conduct
public consultations with the communities and did not propose any reset-
tlement plans before commencing its agro-industry projects.149
Similarly, in the case of Socfin-KCD, the joint venture rubber
company breached its contract with the MAFF by failing to solve resettle-
ment issues “within the period of not later than one year from the date of
signing the contract.”150 Indigenous residents in Mondulkiri province have
complained that systematic land grabbing activities started before any
negotiations for equitable compensation were finalized.151 According to
the FIDH report, a majority of the indigenous populations affected by
Socfin-KCD’s agro-industry projects confirmed that they had no choice
but to sell their land.152 In fact, over seventy percent of these residents
“accepted, for lack of a real choice, insufficient and inadequate monetary
146 SUB-DECREE NO. 146 ON ECONOMIC LAND CONCESSIONS, supra note 127 (citing Article 4:
“Land that has solutions for resettlement issues, in accordance with the existing legal
framework and procedures. The Contracting Authority shall ensure that there will not
be involuntary resettlement by lawful land holders and that access to private land shall be
respected”); see also Complaint Concerning IFC Investment, supra note 7, at 35.
147 See also SUB-DECREE NO. 146 ON ECONOMIC LAND CONCESSIONS, supra note 127, at
Art. 4.
148 Complaint Concerning IFC Investment, supra note 7, at 6, 35.
149 Id.
150 FIDH, supra note 6, at 38; see also MAFF ELC CONTRACT, APPENDIX 2, available at
https://www.fidh.org/IMG/pdf/report_cambodia_socfin-kcd_low_def.pdf [https://perma.cc
/23X5-RVP3].
151 FIDH, supra note 6, at 7.
152 Id.
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compensation, while [the] others who chose to be reallocated on a new
parcel of land were left without any indication on where such parcel
would be.”153
As a result of these forced evictions and lack of adequate consulta-
tion and compensation, indigenous populations affected by ELCs have
become even more vulnerable in Cambodian society. For example, in the
case of the Bousra community in Mondulkiri province, the indigenous
villagers have been deprived of their farming lands and, consequently,
must now rely on commercial markets to sustain their livelihoods. More-
over, the destruction of their various spiritual and burial ground sites
has threatened the very well-being and self-identity of the Bousra indige-
nous community.154
6. International Human Rights Violations
In addition to breaching laws enacted by the Cambodian govern-
ment, rubber ELCs have violated an array of international human rights
set forth in customary law doctrine and multilateral treaties ratified by
Cambodia.155 Under international human rights law, states are required
to do the following:
States have an obligation to respect, protect and fulfill
human rights. The obligation to respect means that States
must refrain from interfering with or impeding the enjoy-
ment of human rights. The obligation to protect requires
States to protect individuals and groups against human
rights abuses committed by third parties, including busi-
nesses. Finally, the obligation to fulfill refers to States’ ob-
ligations to take positive measures to ensure the enjoyment
of basic human rights, [sic] UN treaty bodies, which provide
authoritative guidance on the interpretation of international
human rights treaties, have stated that home States (i.e.,
States where companies are domiciled in their territory
and/or jurisdiction) . . . should take measures to prevent
abuses abroad committed by companies within their juris-
diction as part of their obligation to protect. This exercise
153 Id.
154 Id.
155 Id. at 23.
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of due diligence as an obligation incumbent upon States
has been confirmed by the UN Human Rights Committee,
which affirmed that States have to take appropriate steps
to prevent, punish, investigate and redress harm by pri-
vate entities.156
As seen through their disregard for EIAs,157 exploitation of indige-
nous communities’ property and land tenure rights,158 and forced resettle-
ment procedures,159 Socfin-KCD’s operations in Mondulkiri province and
HAGL’s in Ratanakiri province provide a representative sample of how
the government of Cambodia has been unable to comply with interna-
tional obligations and, therefore, has disregarded its obligation to respect,
protect, and fulfill the enjoyment of Cambodians’ basic human rights.160
On top of international human rights laws, several rights guar-
anteed by the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights161
(“ICCPR”) have been breached by actors within the Cambodian rubber
plantation industry. For example, the ICCPR “protects the freedom of ex-
pression and the right to access to information [Article 19], equality before
the law [Article 14], the right to an effective remedy [Article 2.3(a)] as well
as special protection to national minorities, including indigenous peoples
[Article 27].”162 In fact, the Human Rights Committee “has highlighted
156 Id. (emphasis added).
157 See infra Part II.D.3.
158 See infra Part II.D.4.
159 See infra Part II.D.5.
160 See also SURYA P. SUBEDI, REPORT OF THE SPECIAL RAPPORTEUR ON THE SITUATION OF
HUMAN RIGHTS IN CAMBODIA 47 (2012), available at http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies
/HRC/RegularSessions/Session27/Documents/A-HRC-27-70_en.doc [https://perma.cc/7M5J
-W8KN] (Dr. Subedi, the UN Special Rapporteur for human rights in Cambodia, cites a
variety of human rights violations such as: “the destruction of the environment due to
bulldozing, clearing of land and planting of non-native crops and trees; the lack of con-
sultation with local communities, contributing to their marginalization and conflicts with
companies and local authorities; the undermining of efforts to register indigenous peoples
as legal entities so that they can preserve their culture, language and traditional agricul-
tural practices, and apply for collective land title; encroachment on farm land and areas
of cultural and spiritual significance; the loss of traditional livelihoods and the perpetua-
tion of a gross income disparity (rural poor as compared with wealthy concessionaires and
those benefitting financially from the concessions); lack of access to clean water and sani-
tation; forced evictions, displacement and relocation of people from their homes and farm
lands, creating difficulties with finding or sustaining employment/income-generation and
access to basic services; sub-standard labour conditions.”).
161 FIDH, supra note 6, at 23.
162 Id.
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that Article 27 requires States to protect indigenous peoples’ rights to own,
develop, control and use their communal lands, territories and resources
and recognized their right to restitution (or, if not possible, a just, fair and
prompt compensation) if deprived of their lands and territories tradition-
ally owned.”163
In Mondulkiri province, Socfin-KCD’s denial of the Bousra indige-
nous community’s right to fair compensation164 and, in Ratanakiri province,
HAGL’s destruction of religious spirit forests of indigenous communities165
not only reveal the Cambodian government’s inability to regulate the rub-
ber industry but also reveal the repeated violation of substantive rights
guaranteed by the ICCPR.166
III. POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS AND EVALUATIONS
Due to the governmental, environmental, and human rights viola-
tions linked to Cambodia’s rubber plantation industry, the current regu-
latory framework must be reevaluated and new policies must be enacted
to protect the well-being of both citizenry and country. As observed in the
representative case studies analyzed in this Note, rubber ELCs are sys-
tematically exploiting protected forested areas and destroying indigenous
communities in their rush for rubber.167 The following analyzes the cur-
rent efforts to combat the alleged abuses and also recommends new strat-
egies to strengthen the current laws and policies already in place.
A. Recent Efforts to Regulate the Industry Are Discouraging
In 2012, the Cambodian government released a draft Law on the
Management and Use of Agricultural Land that proposed a number of
alarming policies regarding the regulation of ELCs.168 Instead of focusing
its efforts on minimizing ELC-related abuses, according to the Cambodian
163 Id.
164 Id.
165 Complaint Concerning IFC Investment, supra note 7, at 33.
166 See FIDH, supra note 6, at 48 (stating how “Cambodian authorities at the top level
blatantly circumvent their own legislation to allow concessions to be granted on land oc-
cupied by indigenous communities and protected areas.”).
167 See also GLOBAL WITNESS, supra note 133, at 38.
168 LICADHO, BRIEFING PAPER: CAMBODIA’S DRAFT LAW ON THE MANAGEMENT AND USE OF
AGRICULTURAL LAND 1 (2012), available at http://www.licadho-cambodia.org/reports/files
/169LICADHOBriefingDraftAgriculturalLaw-English.pdf [https://perma.cc/3LSF-VPC9].
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League for the Promotion and Defense of Human Rights (“LICADHO”),169
“[t]he draft law as currently written could be used as legal cover for land-
grabbing and for those who wish to exploit and personally profit from
Cambodia’s land and resources.”170 The draft law, in other words, would
further blemish the rubber industry’s record on governmental, environ-
mental, and human rights violations.
For example, the new laws would eliminate an array of citizens’
private property ownership rights and, subsequently, abolish all current
legal and environmental limitations on ELCs.171 The draft law, further-
more, imposes criminal liability and prison sentences for any violation of
the proposed laws.172 Moreover, the draft law creates a new “agricultural
land lease” framework that overrides many of the regulatory safeguards
created under the 2001 Land Law.173
In light of the severe implications the draft law will have if passed,
civil society organizations have expressed their concerns and recommended
that the proposed laws be significantly revised before their ratification.174
B. Proposed Recommendations to Improve the Industry’s Current
Regulatory Framework
The government has publically announced its intention to draft
new laws specifically tailored to the rubber industry to better regulate
plantation activities and address issues of quality management.175 MAFF
officials stated that the new laws would provide a comprehensive legal
framework that encompasses every stage of rubber production—from
planting and harvesting to export processing.176 However, as of April 2013,
the drafting of the new laws has not been completed and only eighty per-
cent has been finalized.177
Although the Cambodian government has yet to implement any
significant changes to the current regulatory framework, this provides an
advantageous opportunity for the government to consider a variety of novel
and well-documented policy recommendations that are proposed below.
169 LICADHO is a Cambodian human rights organization established in 1992. LICADHO
has a main office in Phnom Penh along with twelve other provincial offices.
170 LICADHO, supra note 168.
171 Id.
172 Id.
173 Id. at 2.
174 Id. at 9–10.
175 Reuy, supra note 9.
176 Id.
177 Id.
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1. Ensure Tougher, Transparent Enforcement Procedures for the
Current Regulatory Framework
Despite the prevalence of violations linked to Cambodia’s rubber
plantations, the existing laws governing the industry,178 when enforced,
can provide safeguards from governmental, environmental, and human
rights abuses. Government officials in Cambodia, however, are frequently
accused of authorizing land grabbing practices with “complete disregard
for laws designed to protect people and the environment.”179 In addition,
the political elite are often linked to, and even control ownership over,
many of the prominent rubber ELCs in the country.180
By imposing civil and criminal sanctions on government authorities
who do not enforce current laws, such as those failing to enforce the legal
size restrictions of ELCs or those neglecting the land tenure rights of
indigenous communities, the industry will become better equipped to re-
spect the rule of law and will provide stronger mechanisms to prevent fu-
ture violations caused by government corruption. As suggested by Global
Witness, an international NGO that has conducted extensive studies on
Vietnamese and Cambodian rubber companies and their suspected land-
grabbing practices, governments must ensure that it can respond to griev-
ances by the public.181 Regulation of the rubber industry would become
more transparent, and private citizens would have more opportunities to
obtain adequate reparation for harm suffered.182 Essentially, Cambodian
government officials should respect their duty to protect and uphold, not
exploit, existing laws governing rubber plantations. By doing so, the in-
dustry would be better positioned to protect both human and environmen-
tal rights of those affected by the plantations.
2. Learn From and Apply Regulatory Policies from Other
Countries in the Mekong Region
Thailand, Indonesia, and Vietnam have been the world’s largest
producers of natural rubber since 1993.183 Incorporating some of the laws
178 Referring primarily to the 2001 Land Law and associated subdecrees.
179 GLOBAL WITNESS, supra note 133, at 38.
180 See id. (stating that the political elite in Cambodia have “connections with HAGL . . . and
appear to be hiding their beneficial ownership of these rubber plantations behind complex
layers of shell companies through opaque concession management processes.”).
181 Id. at 39.
182 FIDH, supra note 6, at 49.
183 Natural Rubber, IHS, https://www.ihs.com/products/natural-rubber-chemical-economics
-handbook.html [https://perma.cc/E988-7BTZ] (last visited Mar. 27, 2016). Thailand is the
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and policies governing rubber production in Thailand and Vietnam, two
of Cambodia’s neighboring countries in the Mekong Region, should be
applied to Cambodia’s own regulatory framework.
The government of Thailand has formally passed legislation that
provides relatively stricter protection of the country’s forested lands.184
Examples of these legislative measures include:
(1) The Forest Act of 1941, which governs the management
of state forests, regulates logging and sets procedures for
licenses and royalty payments; (2) The National Parks Act
of 1961, governing the designation, management and pro-
tection of National Parks; (3) The National Reserved Forests
Act of 1964, governing the designation, management and
protection of National Reserved Forests; (4) The Commercial
Forest Plantation Act of 1992, which requires the registra-
tion of commercial forests and regulates the cutting and
sale of timber in commercial plantations; (5) The Forest
Plantation Act of 1992, which facilitates the creation of
private-sector plantations on degraded forest; and (6) The
Community Forest Bill of 2007, which gives forest-dwelling
communities who can prove they lived in the forest prior
to 1997 rights to preserve and manage forest land under
strict guidelines.185
For example, the National Reserved Forests Act of 1964 classified
9,394,151 ha, or about 59% of the country’s forest lands, as “national con-
served forests,” which is a designation protecting them from clearing,
degradation, and occupation.186 In fact, by 2005, 103 national parks, 84 for-
est parks, 55 wildlife sanctuaries, 16 botanical gardens, and 55 arboreta
were “all protected and strictly controlled” by the above-mentioned laws.187
world’s largest producer of natural rubber, accounting for thirty-four percent of the
world’s production in 2013. Indonesia, the second-largest producer, accounted for twenty-
six percent while Vietnam ranked third.
184 INT’L FORESTRY COOPERATION OFFICE, ROYAL FOREST DEPT. & MINISTRY OF NATURAL
RES. & ENV’T, FOREST MANAGEMENT IN THAILAND 8 (2011), available at http://www.forest
.go.th/foreign/images/stories/FOREST%20MANAGEMENT%20IN%20THAILAND.pdf
[https://perma.cc/9ZLG-C3VT].
185 U.S. AGENCY FOR INT’L DEV., USAID COUNTRY PROFILE: PROPERTY RIGHTS AND RE-
SOURCE GOVERNANCE IN THAILAND 15 (2010), available at http://usaidlandtenure.net/sites
/default/files/country-profiles/full-reports/USAID_Land_Tenure_Thailand_Profile.pdf
[https://perma.cc/3N2L-BSK9].
186 INT’L FORESTRY COOPERATION OFFICE, supra note 184, at 8.
187 Id.
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Furthermore, in Vietnam, the government “is actively participating
in various international initiatives such as the Reducing Emissions from
Deforestation and Forest Degradation (“REDD+”).”188 Involvement in such
initiatives requires Vietnam to “establish and effectively operate mecha-
nisms that address drivers of deforestation and degradation, including
the drivers of natural forest conversion for rubber plantation.”189
Therefore, through its participation in REDD+, the Vietnamese
government is pressured to strengthen the inspection and regulation
procedures of rubber-producing companies in the country; for instance,
“companies with a license to convert forest land to rubber plantations must
be obliged not only to comply with basic regulations on environmental
impact assessment but must also conduct wider consultation processes
with local communities.”190 By joining international initiatives such as
REDD+, the Vietnamese government not only introduces effective mech-
anisms to combat deforestation but also promotes the sustainability of
forested lands in the country.191
The Cambodian government should borrow from Thailand’s pas-
sage of strict legislation on the protection of forested lands and, addition-
ally, should consider joining international initiatives like REDD+ that
compel both governments and companies to address deforestation con-
cerns, as seen in Vietnam. Although violations have also been linked to
certain rubber companies in Thailand and Vietnam,192 Cambodia’s regu-
latory framework can benefit from its neighbors by implementing these
strategies that have proven to be relatively effective in promoting envi-
ronmental sustainability in their respective countries.
CONCLUSION
The rubber industry in Cambodia has fluctuated between periods
of growth and decline throughout recent history. Current production
levels, export revenues, and total coverage area and number of plantations
indicate the emergence of another rubber boom. The government is seek-
ing to profit from the industry’s promising trends; with the privatization
188 XUAN PHUC & TRAN HUU NGHI, RUBBER EXPANSION AND FOREST PROTECTION IN VIETNAM
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of state-owned plantations, passage of legislation supporting foreign in-
vestment, and implementation of the “Rectangular Strategy,” Cambodia
is poised to contend with other competing markets in the greater Mekong
region.
However, the current laws and policies governing rubber planta-
tions do not sufficiently address the human rights, governmental, and
environmental concerns linked to the industry. Existing rubber planta-
tions in the country have exploited indigenous communities’ property
and land tenure rights, engaged in forced resettlement procedures, and
violated an array of international human rights set forth in customary
law doctrine and multilateral treaties ratified by Cambodia.
By creating tougher, more transparent enforcement procedures
and applying well-established policies from its neighboring countries in
the Mekong region, Cambodia’s rubber industry will be better positioned
to fulfill its potential without endangering the livelihood of others.
